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Using unique data on a low-cost airline posted prices and seat availability, this study sheds
some light on whether the airline’s actual practice of yield management techniques con-
forms with some predictions from economic models of peak-load pricing under demand
uncertainty. On the one hand, robust support is found to the notion that prices increase
as the seat availability decreases; on the other, theoretical models that do not account for
stochastic peak-load pricing fail to capture an important source of dispersion in the data.
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1 Introduction
In Europe, the liberalisation process of the airline industry started in 1987 and developed grad-
ually, granting progressively more rights to European carriers to operate within the European
market, until1997whenpermissionwasgrantedtoEuropeancarrierstooperatedomesticﬂights
in member countries other than their home market. In 2004, a last legislative package was is-
sued by the Commission with the aim to create a Single Paneuropean Sky by integrating the air
management structures of the member countries.1
The European liberalisation facilitated the entry of many Low-Cost Carriers (hence, LCC),
whose business model was somehow adapted from the one pioneered in the U.S. by Southwest
Airline. In particular, two airlines, Ryanair and EasyJet, proved to be so successful that by 2004
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Ryanair’s capitalization on the London Stock Exchange overtook that of a leading Full Service
Carrier (FSC), British Airways.
A central element in the business model followed by most Low-Cost Carriers is represented
by their almost total reliance on the Internet as a distribution channel. In this article data on fares
and available seats were retrieved from the Ryanair’ web site in order to shed some light on
some largely unexplored aspect of this airline’s yield management system, i.e., the strategy the
airline follows to set on-line fares under varying conditions of demand uncertainty. A notable
innovation in this study is the possibility to combine fares with the number of seats available at
the time the fare was retrieved.
The simple business model pursued by the airline enable us to test some of the theoretical
predictions derived in Dana (1999). An important characteristic of Dana’s model is that the
prices are set before the actual realisation of demand is known; in practice, based on a set of
probabilities for each possible state of nature, the ﬁrm has to decide the level of prices and the
associated number of seats it will sell for each possible realization of demand. For instance, for
the case of two-states demand (low and high), the ﬁrm will set two prices and the corresponding
number of tickets available at each price. The analysis consider the case in which the ﬁrm
operates in a perfectly competitive market, and the case where the ﬁrm is a monopoly.
Dana shows that regardless of the market structure, the ﬁrm should determine diﬀerent
“batches” of seats, and that fares should increase as fewer batches remain unsold. That is,
the proﬁle of fare should be an increasing function of the number of sold seats. We test this
hypotheses by estimating a pricing proﬁle linking a ﬂight’s seat occupancy with oﬀered fares,
and ﬁnd a positive relationship where, on average, an extra sold seat induces an increase of
3-4% in posted fares.
Another important feature of Dana’s model is the commitment of the ﬁrm to the schedule
of prices it sets before demand is known. That is, once the price and size of each batch of
seats is decided, the airline will strictly adhere to it and will not modify it even if it wanted to
do so. Such a price rigidity may arise from advertisement or promotions, or because the ﬁrm
must incur a very high cost in tracking the evolution of demand for all the ﬂights it operates
and adjust fares to reﬂect demand conditions. Price commitments enforces a price system in
which customers who either arrive early or arrive late when demand is low can buy at lower
prices, while customers who arrive late when demand is high pay a higher price. An individual
consumer at the time of purchase may only observe the price of each ﬁrm’s least expensive
remaining unit, but ex-post consumers will have paid diﬀerent prices solely because of the
random order in which they were served, which reﬂect a diﬀerent level of capacity utilization.
That is, the model does not assume that individuals with a higher willingness to pay arrive at a
late stage. Therefore, the model assume inter-temporal price discrimination away.
In Dana (1999), “stochastic peak-load” pricing, i.e., the adjustment of fares due to an update
on the airline’s information on demand conditions, is ruled out by the assumption that it is
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too costly for the airline to keep track of the evolution of demand on its ﬂights. That is, the
commitment assumed by Dana (1999) is incompatible with possible fare updates the airline
may implement if at some point in time, say 2-3 weeks before take-oﬀ, it ﬁnds out that a ﬂight
is selling better than expected. This implies that in practice we should observe no consistent
departure from the pricing proﬁle when, at speciﬁc points in time, the airline may observe that
only a limited number of seats remain to be sold.
Our results reveal that fare updating seems to take place consistently, leading us to conclude
that “stochastic peak-load” pricing is an integral part of the pricing strategy pursued by one of
the largest European airline, in contrast with the modelling assumption made in Dana (1999).
This is an important contribution of the paper, since the evidence on the impact of stochastic
peak-loadpricingonfaresisscantgiventhediﬃcultytoobtainrelevantdataonseatoccupancy.2
To sum up, the ﬁndings in Dana (1999) lead to the formulation of two hypotheses, that we
put to a test in this paper. First, the relationship between fares and inventories is on average
(non-strictly) monotonically increasing. That is, we should expect that posted fares increase
as the number of available seats falls. Second, in Dana (1999) airlines irrevocably commit
themselves to distributions of prices and seat “buckets” for each ﬂight before learning demand.
Commitment implies that ﬁrms will not change or update their pricing decisions on the basis of
actual bookings, i.e., on how well the ﬂight is selling. Since ﬁrms commit to a monotonically in-
creasing pricing proﬁle, fare reductions between two consecutive booking days when available
seats remain stable or fall, can be interpreted as evidence of updating taking place. Updating
should be more likely as the time of departure approaches and as the number of unsold seats
increases.
The analysis also allows to gain new insights into the inter-temporal proﬁle of posted fares,
a topic that has been largely explored in the existing literature (Pitﬁeld, 2005; Mantin and Koo,
2009). While previous studies showed a monotonic increase of fares as the date of departure
approaches, our estimates suggest a U-shaped relationship which is consistent with a pricing
strategy where the airlines try to adjust fares over time to meet the demand of diﬀerent segment
of buyers, that are heterogenous in their travel motivations.
In the remainder of the paper, a brief introduction to the literature on yield management
is oﬀered in Section 2 , followed by the data presentation, the econometric approach and the
results.
2 Literature Review
Setting airfares and allocating aircraft seats is a complex process. Airlines have to deal with
demand ﬂuctuations, consumer heterogeneity, and the uncertainty about when and where pas-
sengers want to travel. In addition, aircraft capacity is limited and the nature of the product
2See Puller et al. (2009) for a study of a related problem in the case of fares oﬀered by Traditional, Full
Service Carriers.
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perishable, as unsold seats cannot be oﬀered once the ﬂight has departed (Alderighi et al.,
2004).
To deal with these challenges, airlines have developed a set of techniques known as yield
or revenue management (Weatherford and Bodily, 1992). Alderighi et al. (2004) distinguish
between traditional and simpliﬁed yield management. The former is the one developed and
implemented by the FSC to cope with the new competitive environment that followed the lib-
eralization process. The latter deﬁnes the set of techniques implemented by the LCC. In both
cases, a central issue is the need to deﬁne and price certain product characteristics in order to
accommodate passengers’ heterogeneity and diﬀerent willingness to pay. Traditional compa-
nies, aware of travellers’ diﬀerent preferences, have tried to meet such heterogeneity by oﬀering
a diﬀerentiated product with a large variety of in-ﬂight and ground services. Diﬀerent airfares
based on the diﬀerent levels of service quality are therefore oﬀered for the same ﬂight (Puller
et al., 2009). In addition, to ensure that each segment of travellers acquires its required level of
service, companies apply ”fences” such as minimum stays at the travel destination, penalties for
ticket cancellation or travel date change, or purchase time limits. FSC oﬀer such diﬀerentiated
products through reservation classes that reﬂect the market segmentation. To each fare class a
certain number of seats must be allocated in order to optimally accommodate the total demand
(Puller et al., 2009). This crucial forecasting activity is known as inventory control, and it is ap-
plied to all ﬂights operated by each airline in its own network. In particular, purchase time limit
is a ”fence” that has gained more and more importance within the yield management associated
with the pricing by LCC.
The conventional wisdom holds that carriers tend to attach monotonically increasing airfares
to sequential booking classes in order to cope with the uncertainty over demand (Dana, 1999).
McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) refer to the latter practice as ”low-before-high fares” and explain
that it is due to the assumption that booking requests arrive in strict fare sequence, from the
lowest to the highest as the date of departure nears. Many scholars have devoted their attention
to the existence of such airfare dynamics both from a theoretical (Belobaba, 1987; Gale and
Holmes, 1993, 1992; Dana, 1998) and an empirical point of view (Borenstein and Rose, 1994;
Stavins, 2001; Giaume and Guillou, 2004; Pels and Rietveld, 2004; Piga and Bachis, 2007;
Pitﬁeld, 2005). Belobaba (1987), for example, explains that monotonic fares respond to a situa-
tion in which transaction costs of adjusting prices to the incoming information about the actual
demand are high for FSC, especially in the context of complex hub-and-spoke systems. Gale
and Holmes (1993) argue that in a monopoly with capacity constraints and perfectly predictable
demand, advance-purchase discounts (ADP, hereafter) are used to divert demand from peak pe-
riods to oﬀ-peak periods in order to maximize proﬁts. In doing that airlines price discriminate
across customers on the basis of their price elasticity and time valuation. Similarly, when the
demand is uncertain, APD help to improve proﬁtability by spreading customers evenly across
ﬂights before the peak period is known (Gale and Holmes, 1992). The trade-oﬀ faced by a trav-
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eller with uncertain demand between buying early (risking that she might not need to use the
ticket) and buying late (and risk being rationed) is also central in M¨ oller and Watanabe (2009),
where APD appears to be a particularly suitable pricing strategy for airlines. Finally, Dana
(1998) maintains that in competitive markets where prices are set before the demand is known
ﬁrms ﬁnd convenient to implement the ”low-before-high-fares” principle in order to cope with
uncertain consumer demand.
From an empirical view-point, Stavins (2001) was the ﬁrst to develop a model in which
purchase restrictions and time of booking prior to departure were used as explanatory variables.
Although the main objective of her study was to identify the relationship between price disper-
sion and concentration, her estimates also conﬁrmed the idea that such ticket restrictions as the
14 days requirement, exert a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on fares. Giaume and Guillou (2004)
applied the same model to ﬂights leaving from Nice (France) to several European destinations,
ﬁnding further support for the monotonic property. More recently, Escobari (2006) has comple-
mented Stavin’s model with the load factors at the moment of ticket purchases concluding that
airfares’ monotonic increases over time are due to peak load pricing rather than inter-temporal
discrimination. What emerges from the past contributions is the ubiquity of monotonically in-
creasing fares that is assumed to hold even in the simpliﬁed yield management developed by
the LCC, with fares becoming more and more expensive over time. Such a received wisdom is
challenged in Piga and Bachis (2007), who present evidence indicating that for some airlines
the early booking fares may be higher than those available from four to two weeks prior to
departure. It would therefore seem that the monotonic property does not adequately and fully
describe the time proﬁle of many LCCs’ pricing schemes when on-line daily fares are used for
the analysis. This is probably related to the easiness with which fares can be changed online,
due to low menu costs (Smith et al., 1999). Digital markets possess characteristics that do
not appear compatible with a monotonic temporal increase of the oﬀered airfares. It has been
argued for example that search and menu costs are very low on the Internet. Customers and
competitors are thought to be able to easily track down companies’ prices and ﬁnd the cheapest
fare available (Baye et al., 2004; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001).
A strictly monotonic increase of fares over time does not seem to be compatible with the air-
line market where demand uncertainty forces the companies to adjust their fares according to
demand and makes tacit collusion diﬃcult to sustain.
3 Data Collection
Our analysis is based on primary data on fares and secondary data on routes traﬃc, where a
route is identiﬁed in this study as an airport-pair combination.3 The fares in this study were
3Previous studies on pricing behaviour in the U.S. Airlines industry have used diﬀerent cohorts of the
same dataset, i.e., the Databank of the U.S.A. Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination
Survey, which is a 10 percent yearly random sample of all tickets that originate in the United States on
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collected using an “electronic spider”, which connected directly to the website of Ryanair. The
selection of this site was motivated by the fact that it was possible to obtain information about
the number of seats left at the time of the query (see below).
The dataset includes daily ﬂights information from August 2003 up to, and including, June
2005. In addition to Uk domestic fares, routes to the following countries were surveyed: Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, as well as
the UK, whose domestic routes were also considered.
In order to account for the heterogeneity of fares oﬀered by airlines at diﬀerent times prior to
departure, every day we instructed the spider to collect the fares for departures due, respectively,
1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70 days from the date of the query. Henceforth,
these will be referred to as “booking days”.4 The return ﬂight for both types of directional
journey was scheduled one week after the departure. For those routes where an airline operates
more than one ﬂight per day, all fares for every ﬂight were collected. Thus, for every daily ﬂight
we managed to obtain up to 13 prices that diﬀer by the time interval from the day of departure.
The main reason to do so was to satisfy the need to identify the evolution of fares - from more
than two months prior to departure to the day before departure – which has been noted to be
very variable for the case of LCC (Pels and Rietveld, 2004; Giaume and Guillou, 2004).
The collection of the airfares has been carried out everyday at the same time: in addition to
airfares we collected the time and date of the query, the departure date, the scheduled departure
and arrival time, the origin and destination airports and the ﬂight identiﬁcation code. Fares were
collected before tax and handling fees for each one-way trip.
To complement the price data with market structure characteristics, secondary data on the
traﬃc for all the routes and all the airlines ﬂying to the countries indicated above was obtained
from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (henceforth, CAA).5 For each combination of company,
route and departure period (i.e., month/year), the CAA provided the number of monthly seats,
the number of monthly passengers and the monthly load factors. These were broken down at
the ﬂight identiﬁcation code level, that is, for each ﬂight operated by all the airlines in a given
month and route.
3.1 Retrieving Data On Seats Availability
The collection strategy exploited a feature of the Ryanair’s website: during the data collection
period, Ryanair allowed bookings of up to 50 seats using a single query. This made it possible
U.S. carriers (Borenstein, 1989; Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Evans and Kessides, 1993, 1994; Kim and
Singal, 1993; Lederman, 2008)
4For instance, if we consider London Stansted-Rome Ciampino as the route of interest, and assume the
query for the ﬂights operated by a given airline was carried out on March 1st 2004, the spider would re-
trieve the prices for both the London Stansted-Rome Ciampino and the Rome Ciampino-London Stansted
routes for departures on 2/3/04, 5/3/04, 8/3/04, 11/3/04 and so on.
5See www.caa.co.uk
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to learn if, for a speciﬁc ﬂight code on a route, if at the time of the query fewer than 50 seats
were available for booking. The web-spider worked as follows: it issued a query for 50 seats
for a ﬂight, identiﬁed by a speciﬁc ﬂight code on a speciﬁc route. 6 The ﬂight was due to depart
“X” days from the date of the query. If the airline’s site returned a valid fare, then we interpreted
this ﬁnding as follows: “X” days prior to departure, there were at least 50 seats available on the
ﬂight. We could not however retrieve any precise information regarding the actual number of
available seats, which is thus censored at the level of 50. The fare for 50 seats was saved by the
spider.
More interestingly, if the site failed to display a valid fare for that ﬂight, the programme
inferred that there were fewer than 50 seats available and then started a search to obtain the
highest number of seats (N) in a query that returned a valid fare. We interpret this as the
maximum number of seats available, and the fare retrieved corresponds to the unit price at
which the airline is willing to sell all the N seats in a single transaction. The spider created a
record containing the seats and fare info, plus the ﬂight code, the route’s endpoints airports, the
time and date of the ﬂight and of the query. “X” took the following values of the booking days
indicated above.
By repeating the same operation every day, for each daily ﬂight we could track the seats and
the associated fare from 70 up to the day before departure. That is, for each ﬂight code, we have
daily data from September 2003 until June 2005. We consider a variety of routes and in some
cases more than one ﬂight code per route when the airline operated more than one daily ﬂight.
To simplify the data analysis, the procedure considered only ﬂights departing from an airport
within the UK, and arriving at either a domestic or an international airport. Thus, all fares were
in Sterling.
There is an important distinction that has to be made with regards to the interpretation of the
fares retrieved using the procedure previously outlined. If, for example, the spider returned 28
left seats for a given booking day, then the retrieved fare would correspond to the posted fare for
a booking of 28 seats, i.e., for the number of seats that would close the ﬂight. While this fare is
interesting in itself, we complemented it with the fare obtained by running the same query for a
single seat, which resulted from using the spider without the search algorithm for the available
seats. This second set of one-seat fares enables us to evaluate the gradient of the pricing proﬁle.
4 Econometric Methodology
The type of intra-ﬁrm price dispersion described in Dana (1999) arises because prices are set
under uncertainty, so that in equilibrium a ﬁrm will set a price that is inversely related to the
probability of selling an extra unit ofthe product. Asa ﬂight ﬁlls up, the probability of selling an
6Such a feature is not available any more, as only 15 seats at most can now be booked simultaneously.
It is not possible to know why the airline changed this feature; a likely explanation may be that group
bookings rarely exceeds 15 seats.
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extra seat becomes smaller; hence, the ﬁrm will ex-ante set and commit to a fare that increases
with the number of sold seats.










ib denotes the price posted b days before the date of departure t, Qt
ib the number of
seats sold b days before the date of departure t, b is a set of booking days’ dummies, Ut
i is a




observations corresponding to cases in which the airline is posting a promotional (i.e., very low)
fare, αt
i are ﬂights’ ﬁxed eﬀects and ξt
ib is a white-noise error.
The data is structured as a panel with the unit of analysis being a daily ﬂight, identiﬁed by a
speciﬁc code, and the temporal dimension represented by the diﬀerent booking days. In other
words, each panel group tracks the evolution of fares and remaining capacity as the date of
departure nears. To account for the possibility that the price-quantity relationship is ﬂight (or
route) speciﬁc, each model adopts a Fixed-Eﬀects (FE) estimator.7
The characteristics of the collected dataset present the investigator with the need to tackle
two interesting econometric problems. First, the theoretical model in Dana (1999) jointly deter-
mines the size of the “buckets of seats” and the level of price at which they will be put on sale.
That is, while the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator accounts for the possible correlation between Qt
ib and
αt
i, the former may still be correlated with ξt
ib. We address the possible endogeneity issue by us-
ing an Instrumental Variable (IV) technique whose features are related to the other econometric
problem.
Second, inadditiontobeingendogenous, Qt
ib isalsocensored. FollowingWooldridge (2002,
643-644), I ﬁrst obtain the predicted values from the following Tobit model:
Qt
ib = ϑ + θWib + µib, (2)
where Wib represents a set of demand shifters listed in the next subsection. The predicted values
thus obtained are then used as the instrumental variable in the estimation of (1).
4.1 Variable Deﬁnition
We now deﬁne the demand shifters used in the estimation of (2), and then proceed to identify
the variables capturing the possible updating of the airline’s pricing proﬁle.
A set of dummy variables for each booking day, for each day of the week and for the ac-
tual time of departure was included among the regressors in Wib; we therefore aim to capture
possible diﬀering demand conditions over these dimensions.
7The same concern may apply to the promotional variable, although the same methodological solution
apply.
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A dummy for promotional pricing was also included, as well as one identifying routes whose
endpoints are both deﬁned as “bases” by Ryanair. In such routes, we expect to observe a higher
level of traﬃc, as a base operates in ways that are similar to the hubs in a hub-and-spoke system.
The other regressors used in (2) were: the relative size of the citypair to which the route is
part, route length, the number of routes Ryanair operates within the citypair, the total number of
ﬂights all companies operate in the route and in the citypair, and the number of ﬂights Ryanair
operated in the route and in the citypair. All these variable are likely to shift demand for a ﬂight.
A central element of this research pertains to the extent to which the airline modiﬁes its
ex-ante pricing proﬁle to manage unexpected realization of demand. That is, we are interested
in evaluating whether the airline engages in “stochastic peak-load pricing” Borenstein and Rose
(1994). Tothispurpose, wehaveconsideredwhether, atgivenpointsintime, achangeinpriceis
observedwheneveraﬂight’snumberofremainingseatsfallsbelowthefollowingpredetermined
thresholds of 30, 25 and 20 seats. More precisely, for each of these thresholds, we created three
dummies if the thresholds are reached 21, 14 and 10 days prior to departure. These variables
are all equal to 1 if the threshold is reached at the earliest time (i.e., 21 days), but can have
diﬀerentvaluesifthethresholdisreachedatalaterdate. Theeﬀectofsuchdummiesistherefore
cumulative and so their overall eﬀect is given by the sum of the estimates of each dummy.
We expect that their cumulative eﬀect is larger the earlier a lower threshold is reached. That
is, 20 seats remaining three weeks from departure constitutes a clear signal that the demand for
the ﬂight is high, and that therefore the airline can adjust its original pricing proﬁle upwards. So
the magnitude of the updating in price should be inversely related with the number of left seats.
The earlier the threshold is reached, the more likely it is that the airline detects the unexpected
increase in demand and that its fares are modiﬁed accordingly.
5 Results
All estimates were derived using both a standard panel Fixed Eﬀect estimator and an Instrumen-
tal Variables (IV) approach to take into account the endogeneity of “Sold Seats”. The evidence
reveals that the latter variable maintains a positive sign in all speciﬁcations, thereby providing
support to the theoretical results in (Dana, 1999) that fares should increase as capacity ﬁlls up.
The gradient of the pricing proﬁle is about 4% in Table 1, i.e., each extra seats is sold at price
which is about 4% higher than the price of the previous seat. This value remains stable even
after controlling for booking days and the presence of promotional fares oﬀered for a speciﬁc
ﬂight. The inclusion of the latter variable induces an increase of the R2 from about 0.46 to
0.71. Adding a set of “Booking Days” dummies generally improves the goodness of ﬁt and
reveals a quite interesting property. All things equal, when the eﬀect of seat occupancy is taken
into account, the time proﬁle of fares appears to be U-shaped, with the minimum occurring
between 21 and 14 days before a ﬂight’s departure and noticeable price hikes being imposed
just a few days from take-oﬀ. This ﬁnding contradicts other studies that do not control for seat
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Table 1: Fixed Eﬀect (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV) FE Estimates without updating.
Dependent variable:ln(fare).
FE FE IV FE FE IV FE FE IV
Sold seats 0.044a 0.043a 0.036a 0.042a 0.030a 0.040a
Booking Days1 0.232a 0 0.360a 0
Booking Days4 -0.026 -0.230a 0.085 -0.233a
Booking Days7 -0.228a -0.399a -0.118b -0.384a
Booking Days10 -0.222a -0.362a -0.130b -0.349a
Booking Days14 -0.369a -0.474a -0.214a -0.380a
Booking Days21 -0.277a -0.337a -0.167a -0.261a
Booking Days28 -0.180a -0.207a -0.120b -0.164a
Booking Days35 -0.104b -0.110a -0.076 -0.085a
Booking Days42 -0.064 -0.061 -0.029 -0.025
Booking Days49 -0.025 -0.017 0.01 0.022
Booking Days56 0.031 0.045 0.035 0.056c
Booking Days63 -0.017 -0.019 -0.007 -0.01
Promotional Pricing -4.625a -4.563a
Constant 2.850a 2.871a 3.172a 3.164a 3.240a 3.228a
R2 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.46 0.72 0.71
N 89461 89461 89461 89461 89461 89461
Note: a, b, c denote 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
occupancy, where the temporal fare proﬁle is generally shown to be monotonically increasing
(Pitﬁeld, 2005; Mantin and Koo, 2009).
For robustness, Table 2 reports estimates obtained using the full sample of fares, i.e., the
sample where all available ﬂights are included even if the number of available seats does not
fall below the threshold of 50. Previous results are conﬁrmed, as the pricing proﬁle remains
positive and with a gradient varying from about 4.6 to about 8% .
The estimates in Table 3 show that when we introduce the possibility that the airline updates
its pricing proﬁle to account for positive demand realisations, the coeﬃcients for “Sold Seats”,
“Booking Days” and “Promotional Pricing” remain stable. Most importantly, those ﬂights in
which 20 or less seats were available 21, 14 and 10 days from departure on average record
fares that are about 22% (10.7%+6.5%+4.9% in the IV regression) higher. The eﬀect decreases
as the number of available seats increases. When the number of available seats increases to
25, the overall impact on fares diminishes, as expected, to 15% (0.152%+7.0%-7.2% in the IV
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Table 2: Fixed Eﬀect (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV) FE Estimates without updating.
Full sample. Dependent: Ln(fare)
FE FE IV FE FE IV FE FE IV
Sold seats 0.046a 0.084a 0.004a 0.083a 0.012a 0.061a
Booking Days=1 2.158a - 1.370a -
Booking Days=4 1.724a 0.245a 1.009a 0.065a
Booking Days=7 1.052a -0.175a 0.555a -0.225a
Booking Days=10 0.952a -0.047c 0.491a -0.147a
Booking Days=14 0.184a -0.540a 0.170a -0.282a
Booking Days=21 0.003 -0.370a 0.101a -0.129a
Booking Days=28 -0.074b -0.257a 0.051a -0.059a
Booking Days=35 -0.070a -0.159a 0.038b -0.014
Booking Days=42 -0.048b -0.099a 0.042a 0.012
Booking Days=49 -0.113a -0.156a -0.003 -0.026b
Booking Days=56 -0.130a -0.161a -0.033a -0.050a
Booking Days=63 -0.079a -0.105a -0.020a -0.035a
Promotional Pricing -3.909a -4.028a
R2 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.72 0.62
N 408771 408335 408771 408335 408771 408335
Note: a, b, c denote 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
regression); it falls to 3.4% when 30 seats or less were available 21 days or less before a ﬂight’s
departure. It would appear, therefore, that when demand is high (a situation reﬂected by fewer
seats available well before a ﬂight’s departure), for ﬁxed booking times, fares appears to be
pushed upwards relative to ﬂights which are less likely to be ﬁlled up to capacity. This ﬁnding
suggests a tendency by the airline to update its pricing rule in response to particularly favorable
demand conditions.
6 Conclusions
In this study we have illustrated some important features that characterise the yield management
system of the largest European Low-Cost Airline. This was possible thanks to an original way
used to retrieve information on fares and available seats using the airline’s web site.
A main result is the identiﬁcation of the shape of the pricing proﬁle adopted by the airline,
that is, how fares change as the ﬂight ﬁlls up. Consistent with the prediction of the economic
model of yield management proposed in Dana (1999), we estimate a positive relationship be-
tween fares and sold seats, which is stable across regressions. To our knowledge, no other study
has estimated such a relationship.
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Table 3: Fixed Eﬀect (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV) FE Estimates with updating.
Dependent: Ln(fare)
FE FE IV FE FE IV FE FE IV
Sold seats 0.030a 0.041a 0.029a 0.038a 0.028a 0.037a
Booking Days=1 0.274a 0 0.261a 0 0.264a 0
Booking Days=4 -0.003 -0.231a -0.022 -0.241a -0.021 -0.248a
Booking Days=7 -0.208a -0.379a -0.232a -0.402a -0.235a -0.416a
Booking Days=10 -0.221a -0.341a -0.251a -0.376a -0.259a -0.398a
Booking Days=14 -0.317a -0.397a -0.342a -0.431a -0.337a -0.440a
Booking Days=21 -0.277a -0.316a -0.278a -0.330a -0.257a -0.319a
Booking Days=28 -0.187a -0.194a -0.189a -0.209a -0.175a -0.203a
Booking Days=35 -0.073 -0.088a -0.079c -0.090a -0.084c -0.093a
Booking Days=42 -0.021 -0.021 -0.026 -0.024 -0.03 -0.027
Booking Days=49 0.018 0.024 0.016 0.023 0.013 0.022
Booking Days=56 0.042 0.061c 0.043 0.059c 0.039 0.056c
Booking Days=63 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.01 -0.006 -0.009
Promotional Pricing -4.630a -4.578a -4.628a -4.578a -4.634a -4.582a
Days=21; Seats=30 0.171a 0.185a
Days=14; Seats=30 0.034c 0.005
Days=10; Seats=30 -0.044b -0.146a
Days=21; Seats=25 0.132a 0.152a
Days=14; Seats=25 0.088a 0.070a
Days=10; Seats=25 0.014 -0.072a
Days=21; Seats=20 0.082a 0.107a
Days=14; Seats=20 0.076a 0.065a
Days=10; Seats=10 0.117a 0.049a
Constant 3.314a 3.252a 3.336a 3.289a 3.342a 3.308a
R2 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71
N 89461 89461 89461 89461 89461 89461
Note: a, b, c denote 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
Failing to control for seat occupancy is also likely to bias the temporal proﬁle of fares, i.e.,
how fares vary as the date of departure approaches. While the existing literature has gener-
ally posited a strictly monotonic relationship, our estimates indicate that the temporal proﬁle
appears to be U-shaped. This ﬁnding is consistent with the following interpretation, based on
the existence of buyers with diﬀerent motivation to travel. Very early bookers are those who
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need to reach a speciﬁc destination and have very little ﬂexibility on their departure date: their
demand is thus slightly inelastic and they are willing to pay a moderately high price to secure a
place on a speciﬁc plane.8 Early-intermediate bookers are normally those who do not ﬁx their
departure day ex-ante and shop around across diﬀerent departure days and destinations: this
substitutability makes their demand highly elastic.9 Finally, last-minute bookers are generally
those whose choice of destinations and travel dates are ﬁxed, so that they are more likely to be
willing to pay a high fare.10
The second main hypothesis tested in this study looks more closely at another characteristics
of the model in Dana (1999), according to which airlines commit to a ﬁxed and unchangeable
pricing proﬁle. This implies that fares do not reﬂect any new information the airline may re-
ceive on the evolution of a ﬂight’s demand. However, our analysis reveals shifts in the pricing
proﬁle which appear to be inconsistent with the commitment hypothesis. Such shifts are likely
motivated by the airline’s desire to adjust its fares upward to reﬂect positive realization of de-
mand. That is, the possibility that the airline engages in “stochastic peak-load pricing” is not
rejected by our econometric analysis.
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